This paper considers the effect of child care costs on two labor market outcomes for single motherswhether to work for pay and whether to receive welfare. Hourly child care expenditures are estimated using data drawn from the 1992 and 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). These expenditures are then used to predict the probability of welfare recipiency and employment. While the direction and significance of key variables are robust to changes in specification, the quantitative results are found to be sensitive to identification restrictions. All results show a substantial positive effect of child care costs on welfare recipiency, with the child care price elasticity of welfare recipiency varying from 1.0 to 1.9. Similarly, we find a significant negative effect of child care price on employment with elasticity estimates from -.3 to -1.1, showing that controlling for the welfare choice does not reduce the price elasticity of employment found in other studies.
Introduction
For all mothers of young children, entering the labor market is strongly linked with the need for child care. Opportunities for caring for children while in the labor market are few in a developed economy. In many cases, the husband or another family member serves as caregiver, but approx-
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In this paper, we measure the effectiveness of child care assistance policies indirectly by considering explicitly the effect of the cost of child care on welfare recipiency. We find that, over a set of alternative specifications, AFDC recipiency and employment of single mothers are sensitive to the predicted hourly price of child care. The elasticity of recipiency with respect to the predicted price of child care is sensitive to the specification of the final model ranging in value from 1.01 to 1.94 once the jointness of AFDC recipiency and employment are considered. The elasticity of employment with respect to the predicted price of child care is less sensitive to the specification and estimated to be between -0.32 and -0.42, which is similar to what other studies of single mothers have found.
Finally, simulations of child care subsidies show that substantial declines in AFDC recipiency and increases in employment could be achieved with modest means-tested child care subsidies available to all single mothers.
We begin with a summary of evidence concerning the importance of child care costs in the determination of welfare recipiency available from welfare-to-work programs as well as a summary of the existing econometric evidence on this issue. Then we summarize a theoretical model of employment and welfare recipiency and estimate the model using data from 1994 obtained by merging overlapping interviews from the 1992 and 1993 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Finally, we discuss policy simulations designed to enumerate more clearly the importance of child care costs to the welfare population.
Review of Existing Evidence
There are three main sources of information related to our research question on the effect of the price of child care on employment and welfare recipiency. The first source is a large body of econometric work on the effect of child care costs on employment. Much of that literature focused on married women, but a few more recent papers have highlighted differences between married and single mothers. Second is a much smaller set of papers focused on the welfare side of the coin. Finally, there is some evidence from evaluations of welfare-to-work demonstration projects of the importance of child care costs to employment and welfare recipiency.
In terms of the econometric work on the effect of child care costs on employment, that body of work has been well summarized elsewhere (see, e.g., Anderson and Levine 1999; Blau 2000) . This collection of research includes the early work by Heckman (1974) and the economics of child care revival of the late 1980s and early 1990s, which includes, for example, Ribar (1992) . Almost all the studies on employment find a significant negative effect of child care costs on women's employment, although the estimated child care price elasticity with respect to employment varies widely across studies. Most relevant to our current topic are three papers-Han and Waldfogel (1998), Anderson and Levine (1999) , and Connelly and Kimmel (in press)-each of which uses SIPP data from the early 1990 panels to look at differences across marital status. Each of these papers finds evidence that the elasticity of single mother's employment with respect to child care costs is greater in absolute value than married mother's employment elasticity.
The econometrics literature that focus on child care costs and welfare recipiency is more limited. Four papers using national databases are Connelly (1990) , Kimmel (1995 Crecelius and Lin's (2000) model also differs from ours in several ways. First, they estimate a joint model of employment/welfare participation that includes hours worked truncated at zero rather than an employment probit as we do. Previous child care studies have shown that the bulk of the behavioral "action" is in the discrete employment outcome rather than the continuous hours outcome. They find that for each 1 0-cent reduction in child care costs, there are 0.154 to 0.212 more hours worked per week.
Evidence of a positive relationship between child care costs and welfare recipiency can also be found in a number of evaluation studies of welfare-to-work demonstration projects, though the results are not uniform. Anderson and Levine (1999) reviewed evidence from several major welfare-to-work demonstration projects from the late 1980s and early 1990s that included child care components.2 They wrote, "Although the confluence of services, mandates, and incentives in these demonstrations suggests caution is required in interpreting their results, based on this evidence it seems reasonable to conclude that subsidized child care may have a modest effect, at best, in increasing employment levels of very low-skilled, single mothers with small children" (p. 12). However, as the authors point out, none of these demonstrations explicitly examined the importance of child care costs within an experimental framework, so any conclusions relating to the importance of child care costs are tentative at best.
The Minnesota Family Investment Program (MFIP), which was included in Anderson and Levine's review, deserves extra scrutiny because new findings from the three-year follow-up study (conducted with a desirable experimental design based on random assignment into MFIP or AFDC) have now been released. This program was an innovative program based on the dual (and often competing) goals of encouraging work and making work pay. It contained two key work incentive provisions, the second of which related to child care. The MFIP paid child care costs directly to providers for all parents working or participating in employment-related activities. The AFDC reimbursement scheme differed because the parents paid the providers directly and were reimbursed later. According to the MFIP report summary (2000), the practice of reimbursing the mother after the expenditure occurred may have hindered the mother's efforts to get and stay employed. Also, the AFDC reimbursement rules tend to discourage providers from accepting such subsidized clients because of the uncertainty of receiving payment. The third-year follow-up report finds significant impacts in numerous areas, including employment rates and earnings of the MFIP approach.
Finally, Lemke et al. (2000) analyzed Massachusetts state data on current and former TANF recipients who also receive child care vouchers. They find that increased funding for child care subsidies and availability of full-day kindergarten are associated with increased probabilities that current and former welfare recipients will work.3 2 See also papers by Robins (1988) , Joesch (1991), Berger and Black (1992) , and Bowen and Neenan (1993) . These papers are summarized in relation to the question posed here in Connelly and Kimmel (2001) . This study has two serious limitations. First, only those currently receiving child care vouchers are included, making it difficult to draw conclusions about the importance of the availability of such vouchers in employment and training decisions. Second, the probit model of employment has, as its alternative to employment, participation in tormal training or education programs rather than the broader category of nonemployment.
In sum, a thorough review of the broad literature relevant for this paper reveals a uniformity in the direction and significance of the child care price effect but a rather broad range of empirical estimates concering the importance of child care costs on employment probabilities of single mothers. Less has been done in reference to welfare recipiency, but there, too, findings are consistent in the direction of the effect and differ substantially in terms of the magnitude. What are the likely sources of these disparate findings? First, equation specification matters (for an explicit focus on the importance of equation specification, see, e.g., Kimmel 1998). Without careful justification of equation specification and robustness checks, results could be unstable. Second, studies that rely on regional child care price data or complicated across-equation error structures (e.g., Blau and Hagy 1998; Tekin 2000) tend to produce smaller elasticities. On the other hand, studies (such as this one) that rely on predicting child care prices from individual characteristics tend to get larger elasticities. Since the intracity variation in child care expenditures are substantial and SIPP data constitute the only continuing national data set with child care price information, we believe that studies such as ours using individually generated child care prices should not be dismissed or their findings discounted. One of the most important aspects of the market for child care is that individuals face widely different costs for similar services depending on the availability of low-or no-cost child care options. Only individual based models take this variation into account systematically.
Underlying Theoretical and Econometric Models
We begin with a simple model of individual decision making from which equations can be derived that represent the discrete choices about welfare recipiency and employment of mothers with young children. In our model, we assume that mothers of young children seek to maximize their utility over goods and child services, subject to four constraints: a money budget constraint combining the mother's labor income and nonlabor income, a production function for child services, a mother's time constraint, and a child's time constraint. Child services are the commodity parents are consuming from their children; it could be companionship or love or pride in one's progeny. They are produced with a combination of the mother's time at home, the child's time with other caregivers, and money Included among the factors affecting welfare recipiency and employment will be predicted child care expenditures, which are expected to be positively related to the probability of welfare receipt and negatively related to the probability of employment. Increased expenditures on child care lower a woman's effective wage in the labor market when she is not receiving AFDC. Also included among these variables will be her predicted wage (proxying potential earned income), nonlabor family income, dichotomous variables indicating that the mother is nonwhite or unhealthy or lives in an urban area or in the South, factors affecting the value of a woman's time at home (specifically, two dichotomous variables indicating whether the youngest child is age zero to two years and whether there are two or more preschoolers in the family), the state's average Medicaid expenditures per enrollee, the state's average monthly AFDC payment, and the state's unemployment rate. We expect that the woman's wage will be negatively correlated with welfare receipt but positively associated with employment, while those variables that are positively correlated with the value of a mother's time at home, particularly the number of young children in the family, will have the opposite effects on both outcomes.
Estimating the welfare recipiency equation by itself will provide an initial look at the effect of child care costs on AFDC recipiency. However, estimating this equation alone ignores the interaction between AFDC recipiency and employment. Because of kinks in the budget line caused by AFDC regulations, as well as possible discontinuities in hours of employment and child care availability, it is reasonable to suspect that decisions about AFDC recipiency are made jointly with decisions to work for pay. In other words, the error terms in the two equations are correlated. Jointly estimating these two equations is accomplished by estimating a bivariate probit with four possibilities corresponding to the joint outcomes of AFDC recipiency, yes or no, and employed, yes or no. Estimates of the bivariate probit model refine our understanding of the effect of child care expenditures on both AFDC recipiency and employment of single mothers. In addition, use of the bivariate probit model produces more efficient estimates of the parameters and the standard errors.
Description of the Data
The sample of single mothers with children age five or younger used in this paper was drawn from a merged file from the 1992 and 1993 SIPP panels. The SIPP, which is conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, is a large, nationally representative sample of households in the United States.5 In these two panels, SIPP respondents are interviewed every four months for nine interviews, and a special set of child care questions are asked at the sixth interview of the 1992 panel, which overlaps the same calendar time period as the third interview of the 1993 panel. In these overlapping child care interviews, which took place in the second half of 1994, currently employed respondents with children younger than six were asked a number of detailed questions regarding their child care utilization patterns and expenditures. Mothers of such young children are subject to strongly binding child time constraint; that is, these children must be cared for 24 hours of the day by either a parent or a nonparental child care provider. Thus, while some child care costs are also associated with older children, the labor market decisions of mothers with young children are the mostly likely to be affected by the costs of child care.
Using the detailed labor force information from the fourth month of the wave, each mother is defined as employed if she reports positive earnings, hours, and weeks worked. The hourly wage is defined as monthly earnings divided by monthly hours worked. Finally, welfare recipiency equals one if the mother reports any AFDC recipiency during the fourth month of the wave. We added a set of state-based variables to the SIPP's individual-based information. These variables include the constructed dummy variables for urban residence (equals one if the mother lives in a standard metropolitan statistical area [SMSA]), and southern residence (equals one if the mother lives in the South). An additional set of state-based variables was added that includes information drawn from a variety of sources. These variables include the state's average Medicaid payment per enrollee, the state's average monthly AFDC payment, the state's unemployment rate, the state's regulated child:staff ratio of less than 10:1, the state regulated center teachers' education, state per capita income, and, finally, the employers' estimated workers' compensation payment by state.6'7 Table 1 presents the mean values of the variables included in the analysis for five categories of single mothers: all single mothers, those employed, those employed and paying for child care, single mothers receiving welfare payments, and single mothers not receiving welfare payments. Table 2 provides a more detailed breakdown of variable means using subgroups stratified by both welfare and employment status, which is the specific focus of this paper. First looking at Table 1 , we see that 43% of the 1523 women in our full sample are welfare recipients. Thirteen percent of the welfare recipients are employed in the labor market, while 73% of the nonrecipients are employed. In addition, AFDC recipients are slightly younger than nonrecipients (27.7 vs. 28.2 years old) and have, on average, 11.2 years of education-more than one year fewer than the nonrecipients. The AFDC recipients have more children aged zero to two and three to five, are more likely than nonrecipients to be nonwhite, and are considerably more likely to live in poverty.
Employed single mothers are 28.5 years of age, on average, and have 12.5 years of education. Only 26% live in poverty, but two-thirds have income less than twice the poverty threshold. Approximately one-fourth work part time, and 53% report paying for child care. The oldest single mothers are those who are employed and paying for child care, and this subgroup also reports the highest education levels, with 12.6 years of education. Focusing further on the issue of paying for child care, those single mothers employed and paying for care are a bit less likely to be nonwhite and less likely to live in poverty or receive welfare than all employed single mothers. Additionally, they are less likely to work part time, and they earn higher average hourly wages ($8.96 vs. $8.25 an hour). Table 2 , the working single mothers not reporting welfare recipiency are the oldest and have the most education and the lowest poverty rates. Their higher nonlabor income may indicate that they are more likely to be receiving child support payments. The other group with relatively higher nonlabor income is the group not employed and not on welfare. Some of these women are also receiving child support, but there is substantial variation among themselves, as the high poverty rate indicates. Others may be queued for welfare, waiting for their savings to be depleted. Table 2 , note that the nonwelfare group is far less likely to be employed part time and receives a considerably higher average hourly wage ($8.61 vs. $5.41 an hour). In addition, note that while the welfare recipient group is less likely to pay for care 6 The origin of these added state-level variables are listed here: average Medicaid payment per enrollee (Table D5 Means and standard deviations are weighted to obtain population averages using the "topical module" weights supplied by SIPP. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
Turning to

Looking now at the two employed subgroups in
(36% vs. 56%), the recipient group pays a higher hourly price for child care. This may reflect the higher cost of part-time child care (see, e.g., Connelly and Kimmel in press) or the receipt of child care subsidies. Means and standard deviations are weighted to obtain population averages using the "topical module" weights supplied by SIPP. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses.
care and less likely to pay for center-based care. Neither subgroups are very likely to pay for relative care. The welfare recipient subgroup's average weekly payment for center-based care is considerably higher than for those not receiving welfare, but note that only nine single mothers fit this category, a sample of insufficient size for a meaningful statistical comparison. For all single mothers, centerbased care is the most expensive, followed by home-based care and relative care, respectively.
Measuring Child Care Costs and the Problem with Censored Data
Child care costs present a problem for the empirical researcher in that they are often unknown unless the mother is engaged in market work. This is the case with the SIPP data. This situation is similar to the problem of wages that are unobserved if the person is not employed. In addition to the problem of limited observation of the relevant variable, child care is complicated by the fact that many families do not pay the "market price" for child care. Nonprofit centers are often subsidized in the form of free rent and require no return on investment capital. Relatives and friends may be willing to provide child care at a reduced price or at no charge either because they receive in-kind payments or because they enjoy caring for the child. In addition, some families in our sample may already receive a subsidy for their child care costs. How one approaches this problem depends in part on the information available and in part on the question one is trying to answer. Because the focus here is on the mother's decision, only the portion of the cost she pays is relevant. Since we are interested in the effect of child care costs on welfare recipiency and employment, we use the cost of child care per hour of employment, not the cost per hour of child care used. This is the relevant decision variable for mothers of young children who are evaluating the costs and benefits of entering the labor market, with one alternative being receiving welfare. As we argued previously, differences among families in their access to low-or no-cost care is a very pertinent issue for our problem. Using the average local market price of child care alone ignores substantial differences among families in access to below-market child care. The problem is that there is not really an exogenously given price of child care that is relevant to all consumers in the marketplace. Instead, because of differences in family circumstances and location of residence (which are assumed to be exogenous to current decision making), each individual faces her own (exogenously given) price per hour of child care. The approach we use follows from Heckman (1974), who estimated a price of child care for each woman given information about the availability of other potential caregivers.
Because child care costs differ on the basis of the number and ages of young children in the family, we include variables measuring the number of children in fairly specific age categories that relate directly to child care options available to children of various ages. Our measure of child care costs is the predicted cost per hour of employment of child care for the youngest child in the family controlling for the number of other young children in the household.8 The problem of censored data is handled using the methodology described by Tunali (1986) and first applied to the problem of child care by Connelly (1992) . This is a bivariate sample selection correction akin to the well-known Heckman correction to the wage equation (Heckman 1976 ). This method has since been used by a number of researchers interested in estimating child care costs, including the U.S. General Accounting Office (1994), Kimmel (1995) , Powell (1997 Powell ( , 1998 One should note that while we think this method of estimating child care costs has substantial benefits over alternatives such as average child care costs in the location of residence (which is not available with SIPP data), because of its acknowledgment of differences in the probability of paying for care, the disadvantage is that bivariate probits are in general quite sensitive to sample size. In this research context, we found that we could not get robust estimates of the price of child care using the single mothers sample only. So to increase our sample size, we included in our preliminary regressions all women with young children, both married and unmarried women, who are employed and paying for care. With married women included in the sample used for estimating the price of child care (and wage rates), the estimated price of child care is robust to other issues of model specification (Anderson and Levine 1999 also use this technique to resolve robustness problems arising from small subsamples). As long as married and unmarried women do not differ in the structure that converts individual and family characteristics into the probability of paying for child care and the amount paid if the cost is greater than zero other than a shift in the intercept (which we do allow), then our strategy is an appropriate one. If differences between single and married women cannot simply be captured by a single dummy variable, then our estimated price of child care may not fully capture the experience of single mothers' decision making. probability of AFDC receipt. We can also simulate "tied" programs, such as increased child care subsidies enacted in conjunction with lowered AFDC benefits. A set of policy simulations are discussed after our analysis of the main results.
Summary of Estimation and Identification
Our full estimation involves several steps that we summarize here. First, as discussed previously, we must create the two predicted regressors (predicted child care prices and predicted wages). These are constructed with two different sets of preliminary regressions. To construct predicted wages, we use the full sample of married and single mothers to run a reduced-form employment probit equation. This is used to construct the single Heckman correction term for inclusion in the wage equation Table 5 . Table 4 presents The newer finding of Table 4 is the effect of predicted child care expenditures on the probability of AFDC recipiency. As the theoretical model predicts, that effect is positive and significant, with an estimated price elasticity of AFDC recipiency equal to 1.0. Controlling for the price of care, the predicted wage (a proxy for earned income in this equation) is related negatively to the probability of welfare recipiency, with the wage elasticity equal to -0.8. Those with higher nonlabor incomes are also less likely to receive welfare, while families in which the youngest child has one or more siblings under the age of six are more likely to receive welfare.
Estimation and Simulation Results
Results for the employment equation are also consistent with a priori expectations. The child care price elasticity of employment equals -0.4, which falls well within the broad range of estimates 12 We report marginal effects in Table 4 . These unconditional marginal effects were evaluated at the means of the data. The bivariate probit used to estimate the model reported in Table 4 accounts for the correlation between employment and welfare recipiency. Accounting for the correlation in this case is important because unobserved variables relevant to the AFDC outcome are also likely to be relevant to the employment outcome. As expected, the estimated correlation coefficient between the two equations' error terms is negative, significant, and quantitatively large. This suggests that unobserved factors that increase the probability of employment decrease the probability of receiving AFDC.
One concern of models of this type is the robustness of the findings in terms of specification. We discussed the identifying restrictions in the previous section. We experimented with many different specifications of the early stage equations, and as long as we included married women in our sample, Rachel Connellv and Jean Kimmel our results were robust to these changes. We also experimented with adding some of the overidentifying variables back into the final probit and were encouraged by the retention of significance of both of the generated regressors regardless of the specification. Of particular interest was a final model that included age and education in addition to the predicted wage and predicted price of child care. The elasticities that result from that specification are almost the same in terms of the employment elasticities but are much larger in terms of the welfare recipiency elasticities. The comparison is shown in Table 5 . Since age and education figure so prominently in the value of the wage variable, it would be "pushing" our 1523 observations too hard to expect enough variation to keep education, age, wage, and the price of child care all in the final stage equation. Thus, we prefer our specification over the expanded version but caution that the reported elasticities are sensitive to this specification choice.
The quantitative results are also sensitive to the estimation strategy used. We experimented with several alternatives, including univariate probits of employment and recipiency separately and a multinomial logit model that treats the four cells of our bivariate probit as four separate states of the world. The univariate probit might be preferred for ease of calculation. However, the bivariate probit model of Table 4 The most common alternative to the multinomial logit model is a nested logit model, but this model is basically equivalent to the bivariate probit in the 2 X 2 case.14 Table 5 presents the elasticities of changes in employment and welfare recipiency due to changes in the price of child care and wages for three models: the univariate probit, the bivariate probit, and the multinomial logit for the same specification of the final model. The reader will note that the elasticities are sensitive to the change in estimation strategy with our preferred bivariate probit providing, in general, the smallest elasticities. Table 6 presents a set of simulations designed to assess the impact of child care subsidies on the probability of AFDC recipiency and on the probability of being employed. While these simulations do not address specific welfare reform proposals, the simulations help illustrate the study's estimates of price effects. The simulations were done using the coefficient estimates of Table 5 and the actual Table 4 Square Included Probit in Table 4 expenditures were subsidized 10% for all single mothers, the predicted level of AFDC recipiency falls to 34.9%, and employment rises to 52.8%. A means-tested subsidy of 10% for all women below median annual income of $24,600 has little impact on the probability of receiving AFDC or being employed compared to the non-means-tested subsidy but would cost considerably less. Tying a meanstested 10% child care subsidy with a reduction in average AFDC receipts is successful in reducing AFDC recipiency from 36.0% to 32.2% but has almost no impact on employment.
With child care expenditures reduced to one-half for all single mothers, AFDC recipiency would fall further to 12.5%, while employment is predicted to rise to 74.7% (row 6). Making the child care subsidy means tested moves the AFDC recipiency rate up to 17.6% (row 7), still a substantial reduction from the baseline 40.2% with a large cost savings. Tying the child care subsidy to a reduction in average state benefits (row 8) reduces the receipency rate still further to 15.1% and increases the employment rate to 69.5% with further cost saving in AFDC expenditures. Taken as a whole, these results of our simulations indicate that subsidizing child care costs for all single mothers may be an important policy tool leading to lower AFDC recipiency rates. These subsidies could be packaged with existing federal TANF program restrictions on length of total, lifetime welfare recipiency, and work requirements to improve living standards for ex-recipients by helping to "make work pay." Table 7 makes explicit the cost versus saving trade implicated to our discussion of Table 6 . Table 7 , column 1, shows the estimated annual savings in the total AFDC expenditures that would result from the lower AFDC recipiency rates alongside estimated annual costs of the subsidy. These are "back-of-envelope" calculations using each woman's predicted wage assuming full-time employment and full-time use of child care and predicted price of child care for the youngest child. Savings are accrued if the woman was predicted to be receiving AFDC in the baseline calculation and predicted to be not receiving AFDC in the simulation. Child care subsidy costs were accrued if the woman was predicted to be employed in the simulated scenario. The savings ignore potential savings from Medicaid, food stamps, and other means-tested programs, such as housing and potential gains of income tax dollars. The costs columns ignore the child care costs of a second or third child in the same family. Column 2 assumes that only single mothers' child care costs are subsidized and ignores increased government obligations from the earned income tax credit. Column 3 again assumes that only single mothers' child care costs are subsidized but 
Conclusions
Many papers have examined the effect of child care costs on the labor market decisions of mothers of young children. This paper is one of only a few that looks specifically at the effect of child care costs on the decisions of single mothers concerning employment and AFDC recipiency. In doing so, it seeks to answer the questions made so relevant first by the Family Support Act of 1988 and more recently by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996: Can subsidizing child care reduce the welfare dependency of single mothers?
The answer seems to be an unequivocal yes, though the size of the estimated effect is found to be sensitive to the specification of the model and the estimation strategy used. Simulations using our preferred specification, which has much smaller elasticities with respect to recipiency, show that AFDC recipiency is reduced by 28 percentage points when child care expenditures are subsidized by 50% for women with annual incomes below the median and, equally important, that employment is increased by more than 25 percentage points. While that sounds like a large subsidy, recall that the average weekly expenditure on child care is about $58. However, any program that was designed to address the quality of child care would raise this average weekly cost. Availability would also be of concern, particularly for infants, and any solution to the availability problem could also increase overall subsidy costs.'5 Finally, these simulations do not reflect a broad equilibrium system that would model reverberations of such a subsidy throughout the entire economy. Projection of the ultimate total impacts of such a policy is complicated and perhaps falls outside of what we can expect from databased analysis. Yet the estimates presented in this paper do show the value of child care subsidies in encouraging self-sufficiency gained through market work. Table values are coefficients from the employment probit equation and the OLS (In)wage average equation. T-statistics are in parentheses. Significance level * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = c%. These results are used to construct the predicted wage for each mother in the sample, which is used in the models presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
